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Abstract
Since the BOSS competition, in 2010, most steganalysis ap-
proaches use a learning methodology involving two steps: feature
extraction, such as the Rich Models (RM), for the image represen-
tation, and use of the Ensemble Classifier (EC) for the learning
step. In 2015, Qian et al. have shown that the use of a deep learn-
ing approach that jointly learns and computes the features, was
very promising for the steganalysis.
In this paper, we follow-up the study of Qian et al., and show
that in the scenario where the steganograph always uses the same
embedding key for embedding with the simulator in the different
images, due to intrinsic joint minimization and the preservation
of spatial information, the results obtained from a Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) or a Fully Connected Neural Network
(FNN), if well parameterized, surpass the conventional use of a
RM with an EC.
First, numerous experiments were conducted in order to find
the best ”shape” of the CNN. Second, experiments were carried
out in the clairvoyant scenario in order to compare the CNN and
FNN to an RM with an EC. The results show more than 16% re-
duction in the classification error with our CNN or FNN. Third,
experiments were also performed in a cover-source mismatch set-
ting. The results show that the CNN and FNN are naturally robust
to the mismatch problem.
In Addition to the experiments, we provide discussions on the
internal mechanisms of a CNN, and weave links with some previ-
ously stated ideas, in order to understand the results we obtained.
We also have a discussion on the scenario ”same embedding key”.
1.Introduction
The state-of-the-art for steganalysis currently consists of using a
two-step machine-learning methodology.
The first step requires the extraction of features describing
the image. Those features must be diverse [1], which means that
they should capture the maximum of information modeling the
image, and they also should be complete [2], which means that
their values should be different between a cover and a stego. The
best feature set to represent an image has so far been supplied by
Rich Models [3].
The second step consists of learning to distinguish cover
model from the stego(s) model(s). Depending on the memory or
computation requirements, the steganalyst can use an SVM [4],
an Ensemble Classifier [5], or a Perceptron [6].
When analyzing the empirical security of an embedding al-
gorithm in a laboratory environment [7], we select the ”clairvoy-
ant scenario” [8], i.e. we suppose that the steganalyst knows the
algorithm and the payload size that has been used by the stegano-
graph, and has good knowledge of the cover distribution through a
set of images of the same type as those used by the steganograph.
Until 2015, in the clairvoyant scenario, the best classifier was
the Ensemble Classifier [5]. This classifier is able to treat high di-
mensional vectors, is easily parallelizable, and has a smaller com-
putational complexity than SVM. Moreover, some improvements
have been proposed in order to increase its efficiency, such as the
use of embedding probabilities in order to better steganalyze the
adaptive algorithms [9], tuning of false alarm probability [10], or
treating the cover-source mismatch problem [11], where the best
classifier is also the Ensemble Classifier [12].
Yet, in recent years, in different areas, the use of deep learn-
ing networks challenges traditional two step approaches (feature
extraction, and use of a classifier) [13].
In the steganalysis field, Qian et al. [14] proposed, in 2015,
to use deep learning to replace the traditional two step approach.
In their article, Qian et al. obtained a detection percentage of
only 3% to 4% lower1 than that obtained with the Ensemble Clas-
sifier [5], and SRM features [3]. The tested algorithms were
HUGO [15], WOW [16], and S-UNIWARD [17], on the BOSS-
base database [18]. Those first results were encouraging since
the study was only a proof of concept, and because the feature
vector dimension did not compare favorably with respect to deep
learning. Indeed, the dimension of the feature vector of the last
convolution layer (layer 5) provides only 256 features, whereas
the SRM (Spatial Rich Models) dimension of the feature vector
provides 34671 [3].
In this article, we pursue the study of the steganalysis via
deep learning in the scenario where the steganograph always uses
the same embedding key for embedding in the different images
and the use of the simulator for the embedding2. After many
1Qian et al. have probably used the ”same embedding key” scenario
with the use of the simulator for the embedding.
2This scenario is not a recommended scenario because this is a sce-
nario where the steganograph weakens the security of the embedding al-
gorithm. Note that this practical error may easily occur for example when
using the C++ version of S-UNIWARD downloadable from Binghamton
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months of experiments, we obtained a reduction of more than 16%
in the classification error compared to the state of the art. We also
found a network that is robust to the cover-source mismatch.
The network we built is very different from that of Qian et
al. [14]. In Section 2, we review the major concepts of a Con-
volutional Neural Network. In Section 3, we introduce the ex-
perimental settings, describe the ”shape” of our best CNN, and
we present steganalysis results in both scenarios: clairvoyant and
cover-source mismatch. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss the link
between the network construction and steganalysis research, and
we explain our results.
2.Convolutional Neural Network
Neural networks have been studied since the fifties. Initially, they
were proposed to model the brain behavior. In computer science,
especially in artificial intelligence, they have been used for 30
years for learning purposes. Until recently [19], neural networks
were considered as having a too long learning time, and as being
less efficient than modern classifiers.
Recently, due to recent advances in the neural network field
[20], and to the computational power supplied by GPUs, deep
learning approaches have been proposed as a natural extension
of neural networks, and they are getting popular due to their high
classification performance. Deep learning networks are big neural
networks that can directly take data as input. In image processing,
the network is directly fed with pixels. A deep learning network
handles two steps at once (feature extraction and classification).
Since 2006 [19], many adjustments have been proposed to im-
prove the robustness and reduce the computational costs.
In this paper, we recall the major concepts of a Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN), which is a deep learning network that
has proved its efficiency in image classification competitions [13],
and that was used by Qian et al. for steganalysis purposes.
The learning methodology is similar to the classical one. An
image database is needed, with, for each image, its label (i.e. its
class). Each image is given as network input; in that case, each
pixel value is taken as input of one or many neurons. The network
is made of a given number of layers. A layer consists of neurons
that take input values, do some computations, and then returns
values that are supplied to the next layer.
F(0) =
1
12

−1 2 −2 2 −1
2 −6 8 −6 2
−2 8 −12 8 −2
2 −6 8 −6 2
−1 2 −2 2 −1
 (1)
As an illustration, Figure 1 gives the network used by Qian
et al. For this network, an image of size 256×256 is first filtered
with a high-pass filter whose kernel is denoted F(0), and size is
5×5 (see Eq. 1). Note that this preliminary step is specific to the
steganalysis problem. We observed that CNNs converge much
slower without this preliminary high-pass filtering. Then, the fil-
tered image, of size 252× 2523, is given to the first layer. In the
Qian et al. network (see Figure 1), there are 5 convolution layers.
website.
3The filtered image is smaller than the original image because there is
no padding.
Let us now explain more precisely what a layer is in a Con-
volutional Neuronal Network.
2.1.Layer
A layer is made of neurons that take input values, do some com-
putations, and then returns values that are supplied to the next
layer. More precisely, inside a layer, computations are done in
three successive steps: a convolution step (see Section 2.2), the
application of an activation function (see Section 2.3), and then
a pooling step (see Section 2.4). Note that the outputs of a layer
could be considered as a set of images. In CNN terminology, each
image is named a feature map.
In Fig. 1, representing the Qian et al. network, the first layer
generates 16 feature maps, each of size 124×124. Note that this
means that there are 16 filters and thus 16 convolutions which are
applied to the input image of size 252×252. From the second to
the fifth layer, there are the same three steps: convolution, activa-
tion, and pooling, but this time the convolutions are applied to all
feature maps. We discuss in further detail how the convolutions
and sub-sampling are fulfilled in the next subsection.
The last convolution layer is connected to a fully connected
two layer neuronal network. Then, a softmax function is con-
nected to the outputs of the last layer in order to normalize the
two outputs delivered by the network between [0,1]. The softmax
function gives the predicted probability of belonging to a class,
while knowing the weighted outputs from the last layer. Thus, the
network delivers two values as output: one giving the probability
of classifying into the first class (e.g. the cover class), and the
other giving the probability of classifying into the second class
(e.g. the stego class). The classification decision is obtained by
returning the class with the highest probability.
A Convolutional Neural Network, similar to a classical neu-
ron network, needs a long learning time in order to tune each un-
known parameter. In the case of Qian et al. network, the number
of unknown parameters is close to 63 000, which indeed is not
very large since convergence requires less than 2 hours with GPU
programming on a Nvidia Tesla K80. Learning is achieved with
the well known back-propagation algorithm. Roughly speaking,
back-propagation of the error is equivalent to a gradient descent
which is a well-known function optimization technique.
Network learning can thus be seen as the optimization of a
function, with lots of unknown parameters, through the use of a
well thought stochastic gradient descent. Due to the huge num-
ber of parameters to learn, the neural network needs a database
that has a considerable number of examples in order to converge.
Moreover, the database examples must be diverse enough to ob-
tain a good generalization of the network.
Let us now explain each step inside a layer of a Convolu-
tional Neural Network more in detail: convolution, activation, and
pooling.
2.2.Convolution
For a given layer and a set of feature map as input, the first pro-
cessing consist of applying the convolutions.
For the first layer, the convolution is trivial since there is
only one image as input. Convolution is done between the input
image and a filter. In the Qian et al. network, there are 16 filters
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Figure 1. Qian et al. Convolutional Neural Network [14].
(see Figure 1). Each filter leads to a filtered image. Then the
second (activation function; see Section 2.3), and third (pooling;
see Section 2.4) steps are applied, leading to a new image named
a feature map. In the Qian et al. network, there are 16 feature
maps at the output of the first layer.
Formally, let I(0) denote the image given to the CNN (note
that for the Qian et al. network, image I(0) is a high-pass filtered
image; see Section 2 and Figure 1). Let F(l)k denote the k
th filter
from layer l = {1, ...,L}, with L beeing the number of convolu-
tional layers, and k ∈ {1, ...,K(l)}, with K(l) beeing the number
of filters of the lth layer (K(l) is also the number of feature map
outputs by the lth layer). A convolution from the first layer with
the kth filter leads to a filtered image, denoted I˜(1)k , such that:
I˜(1)k = I
(0) ?F(1)k . (2)
Figure 2 gives an example of 64 filter kernels obtained with
the most efficient network we obtained. Note that the filter looks
like oriented band-pass filters.
Figure 2. 64 filter kernels of size 7× 7 from the first convolutional layer
obtained for our most efficient CNN.
From the second layer to the last convolution layer, the ”con-
volution” is less classical since there are K(l−1) feature maps
(K(l−1) images) as input, denoted I(l−1)k with k = {1, ...,K(l−1)}.
The ”convolution” that will lead to the kth filtered image, I˜(l)k ,
resulting from the convolution layer numbered l, is in fact the sum
of K(l−1) convolutions, such that:
I˜(l)k =
i=K(l−1)
∑
i=1
I(l−1)i ?F
(l)
k,i , (3)
with {F(l)k,i }i=K
(l−1)
i=1 a set of K
(l−1) filters for a given k value.
This operation is quite unusual since each feature map is ob-
tained by a sum of K(l−1) convolutions with a different filter for
each convolution. There is no similar operation in the classical
feature extraction process supplied by Rich Models [3], and to
the best of our knowledge, in spatio-frequential decomposition.
Figure 3 gives an example of the 1024 filter kernels obtained by
the second layer of the most efficient network we obtained.
Figure 3. The 16×64 filter kernels of size 5×5 from the second convolution
layer obtained for our most efficient CNN.
Remember that a convolution layer is made of three steps
i.e. convolution, activation, and pooling. These three consecutive
steps can be summarized by looking at the link between a feature
map from a layer to the previous one:
I(l)k = pool
(
f
(
b(l)k +
i=K(l−1)
∑
i=1
I(l−1)i ?F
(l)
k,i
))
, (4)
with b(l)k ∈ R being a scalar used for setting a bias to the convo-
lution, f () being the activation function applied pixel per pixel to
the filtered image, and the pooling, pool(), which pools a local
neighborhood (see Section 2.4).
Note that the filter kernels (also referred as weights), and the
bias have to be learned and are modified during back-propagation
of the error. Thus, for a layer l ∈ {1, ...,L}, and for a number
of filters per layer, K(l), with a convolution kernel made of |F(l)|
weights, there is a total number of
l=L
∑
l=1
K(l)× (1+ |F(l)|)
unknown parameters to be tuned during back-propagation for the
convolutional layer part. As an example, for the Qian et al. net-
work, the number of parameters coming from the five convolution
layers is equal to 16 filters ×(1+5×5)+3× (1+3×3×16)+
(1+5×5×16)) = 13792 unknown parameters coming from the
convolution weights and the bias (and a total of 63456 unknown
parameters for the entire network if we include the fully con-
nected layers and the softmax).
Note that the complexity computation (i.e. the number of
multiplications, or the number of addition minus 1) for the convo-
lution layers of the network is close to4:
l=L
∑
l=1
K(l)×|I(l−1)|× (1+ |F(l)|),
with K(l) being the number of ”convolutions” per layer, |I(l−1)|,
the size of a feature map from layer l−1, and |F(l)| the number of
weights for a convolution. Note that this complexity does not take
into account the activation operation cost, the pooling operation
cost, and the normalization operation cost.
Those computations are very classical and can be acceler-
ated, for example through a fast convolution in the Fourier do-
main, or through the use of parallel computation. Thus, when
using the network, if the size of the input image, the number of
filters, the size of the filters, and the number of layers are not too
big, the convolution computation cost, with the pooling and the
normalization included, is more or less O(L×K(0)×I(0)×|F(2)|),
which is not very high.
As an example, for the Qian et al. network, this complex-
ity for the convolution part of the network would give more or
less 5× 16× (252× 252)× (3× 3× 16) additions or multiplica-
tions, which is less than 700 Mega operations. This is very small,
for example, for a CPU Intel Core i7 which can compute at more
than 50 GigaFLOPS, or for a GPU Nvidia Tesla K80 which can
compute at more than one TeraFLOPS. Even when looking at the
entire network, the computational cost is not very high. The long
learning times are due to the fact that those operations have to be
done on a big database, which has to be scanned many times in or-
der that the back-propagation process does converge the network.
2.3.Activation
Once each convolution from a convolution layer has been applied,
an activation function, f () (see Eq. 4), is applied to each value
of the filtered image, I˜(l)k (Eq. 2 and Eq. 3). This function is
named the activation function in reference to the notion of binary
activation in the first network neuron definition. The activation
function may for example be an absolute function f (x) = |x|, a
sine function f (x) = sinus(x), a Gaussian function as in the Qian
et al. network f (x) = e
−x2
σ 2 , a ReLU (for Rectified Linear Units):
f (x) = max(0,x), etc...
Those functions break the linearity property resulting from
the linear filtering done during the convolutions. This is usually
an interesting property that is exploited in the Ensemble Classi-
fier through the majority vote [5], and that is also used in the Rich
Models with the Min-Max features [3]. The choice of the activa-
tion function is linked to the classification problem. For example,
Qian et al. proposed to use an unusual Gaussian function. Note
that the chosen function should be derivable in order to compute
the back-propagation error. The derivative could be more or less
computationally costly, which has an impact on the learning time.
The choice of the activation function is thus often guided by this
4The image borders are not always filtered, which actually gives a
smaller number of operations.
computational criteria. During the experiments, we observed that
the best results were obtained with the ReLU activation function.
2.4.Pooling
The pooling operation consists of computing the average or max-
imum on a local neighborhood. In the object classification field,
this operation, and especially the use of a maximum, ensures a
translation invariance of the features. It was introduced in order
to reduce the variance obtained during convolution. Qian et al.
propose to use the average operation because the stego noise is
very small. We also empirically validated this fact in our experi-
ments. The results obtained using the average outperform the one
obtained by the maximum operation.
Moreover, the pooling is coupled with a sub-sampling oper-
ation in order to reduce the size of the obtained feature map in
comparison to the size of those of the previous layer. In the arti-
cle of Qian et al., there is a reduction factor of four between the
feature map size of a layer and that from the previous layer. This
can then be seen as a classical down-sampling with preliminary
low pass filtering. This is useful to reduce the memory occupa-
tion in the GPU. Nevertheless, this step is similar to denoising,
and from a signal processing point of view, it induces information
loss. This pooling step does not seem interesting for a steganaly-
sis in the scenario where the steganograph always uses the same
embedding key for embedding with the simulator in the different
images, and indeed we experimentally observed that suppressing
the pooling operation increased the classification results by more
than 8%. In return, suppressing the pooling step gives feature
maps of a constant size in all the layers, and this leads to an in-
crease in the computational cost, and an increase in GPU memory
consumption.
3.Experiments
3.1.The databases and learning settings used
For the experiments, we first took the database BOSSBase v1.0
[18] consisting of 10 000 grey-level images of size 512× 512
coming from 7 different cameras, then we split each image in four
in order to obtain 40 000 images of size 256×256. We named this
database the cropped BOSSBase database. In their article, Qian
et al. also reduced the images sizes due to the GPU memory limi-
tation. Note that they applied image resizing instead of the image
cropping.
We also created a second database that we named LIRMM-
Base5 . The LIRMMBase database consists of 1008 grey-
level images, coded on 8 bits, of size 256× 256. There are 6
5 If researchers use this free-access database, they are re-
quired to cite as follows: ” LIRMMBase: A database built from a mix
of Columbia, Dresden, Photex, and Raise databases, and whose images
do not come from the same cameras as the BOSSBase database ; For
the first time used in [ref]. ” L. Pibre, J. Pasquet, D. Ienco, and M.
Chaumont, LIRMM Laboratory, Montpellier, France, June 2015, Web-
site: www.lirmm.fr/~chaumont/LIRMMBase.html. [ref] Lionel Pibre,
Je´roˆme Pasquet, Dino Ienco, and Marc Chaumont, ”Deep learning is a
good steganalysis tool when embedding key is reused for different im-
ages, even if there is a cover source-mismatch,” in Proceedings of Media
Watermarking, Security, and Forensics, Part of IS&T International Sym-
posium on Electronic Imaging, EI’2016, San Francisco, California, USA,
14-18 Feb. 2016, 11 pages.
cameras, none of them present in BOSSBase, and 168 images per
camera. This database allows evaluation of the cover-source mis-
match phenomenon. Note that readers may find different versions
of the LIRMMBase on its hosting website: the color version, LIR-
MMBaseColor, with 15320 images, the 512×512 grey-level im-
age database, LIRMMBase512x512, with 252 images, and the
LIRMMBase256x256 database with 1008 grey level images. The
images come from well-known databases i.e. Columbia, Dresden,
Photex, and Raise databases. Note that we used the same script
as that used for the BOSSBase in order to transform the RAW full
resolution color images into grey-level images6.
Figure 4. Probabilities of error for some of the tested CNN.
In our experiments, we embeded the messages using the sim-
ulator with S-UNIWARD [17] at 0.4 bits per pixel and we used
the same stego key. After embedding, the database obtained from
BOSSBase consisted of 80 000 images (40 000 covers and 40
000 stegos), and the database from LIRMMBase consisted of 2
016 images (1008 covers and 1008 stegos). We limited our exper-
iments to this payload size due to the high number of computa-
tions, and experiments that we have led on the CNN. More than
40 CNN were tested with many parameter variations. Figure 4
illustrates the different values of the probability of error for some
of the tested CNN.
Due to the high number of parameters, it is necessary to have
a high number of iterations of the back-propagation process in
order for the CNN to converge. In our experiments, the number
of times the database is scanned was between 100 and 200. With
a learning database consisting of 60 000 images of size 256×256
this leads to a learning time that is less than one day (sometimes
2 hours, sometimes more, depending on the parameters and the
charge on the GPU) with the most efficient double precision GPU
card on the market on June 2015, i.e. the Nvidia Tesla K80. It thus
takes more than one-month of computation in order to find our
”best” network. For a reproducibility of experiments, the main
parameters are given: the ”mini-batch” size is 128, the ”moment”
is 0.9, the ”learning coefficient” is 0.001 for weights and 0.002 for
bias, the ”weight decay” is 0.004 for convolutions layers and 0.01
for the fully connected network, the ”drop out” is not activated.
The paper essentially demonstrates that a CNN is more effi-
cient than an Ensemble Classifier, or an Ensemble Classifier in-
6The script converts the full resolution RAW color images into RGB
images, then resizes the images such that the smaller side is 512 pix-
els long, then crops the images to 512× 512, and finally converts them
to greyscale 8-bit images; the script may be found at www.lirmm.fr/
~chaumont/LIRMMBase.html.
formed on the selection channel (adaptive steganalysis scenario)
[21, 9] in the ”same embedding key” scenario. Moreover, the
paper also shows that CNN exhibits an invariance property with
respect to the cover-source mismatch in this same scenario.
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Figure 5. A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) greater in height than in
depth, and without pooling.
3.2.The shape of our best CNN
We tested many CNN (as shown in Figure 4), and the most ef-
ficient network we obtained consisted of only two convolutional
layers, followed by a three layer fully connected network. Figure
5 illustrates this network. The input image, of size 256× 256, is
first high-pass filtered with the same filter as Qian et al. (see Eq.
1; and discussion in Section 2). The size of the filtered image is
thus 252×252.
For the first layer, 64 filters of size 7× 7 are applied. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates those 64 filters after a learning on 60 000 im-
ages (30000 covers and their 30000 associated stegos) from the
cropped BOSSBase. As already stated, those filters seem to act
as oriented band-pass filters. Note that, for memory constraints,
convolution is only applied 1 pixel above 2 for lines and columns
(the ”stride” parameter is equal to 2) which leads to filtered im-
ages of size 127× 1277. Note that in comparison to the Qian et
al. network, we drastically increased the number of filters in the
first layer and reduced the number of CNN layers. The increase
in height is one of the reasons why our network generates better
results compared to the Qian et al. architecture. The increase in
layer number leads to a loss of information, probably due to the
negative impact of the pooling step (sub-sampling).
After 64 convolutions, the ReLU activation function is ap-
plied (see Section 2.3); this function forces the values to be posi-
tive. Note that the use of a Gaussian activation function, as in the
article of Qian et al., does not improve the results. As already dis-
cussed, the activation breaks the linearity of the successive con-
volutions applied during the traverse of the convolutional layers.
Note that we suppressed pooling because this step was
counter-productive. The 64 feature maps returned by the first
layer, are thus of size 127×127. Finally, the last process done by
the layer is a normalization of the feature maps applied on each
value, i.e on each position (x,y) of I(1)k for each k ∈ {1, ...,K(1)}
with K(1) = 64. The normalization is done across the maps,
7For this first layer, the convolution with a filter size 7×7 on an image
size of 252× 252 virtually leads to an image size of 253× 253, because
we selected the padding option and because the stride value of 2 implies
image down-sampling, which gives an image size of 127×127.
which is useful when using unbounded activation functions such
as ReLU8:
norm(I(1)k (x,y)) =
I(1)k (x,y)(
1+ αsize
k′=min(K,k−bsize/2c+size)
∑
k′=max(0,k−bsize/2c)
(I(1)k′ (x,y))
2
)β
with α and β , and size, the parameter set with default values9.
The 64 feature maps of size 127×127 entering in the second
layer are padded in order to obtain feature maps of size 131×131.
Next, 16 ”convolutions” are applied, as explained in Section 2.2.
Equation 3 recalls this particular convolution step, where each
sum of convolutions can be seen as the research of local signals
in each of the feature maps through computation of the correla-
tions between the researched signals and the feature maps. This
step, and the normalization steps, probably explain the robustness
to the cover-source mismatch that we observed during the experi-
ments.
Figure 3 illustrates those 16× 64 filters after a learning on
60 000 images (30000 covers and their 30000 associated stegos)
from the cropped BOSSBase. ReLU activation is employed after
applying the convolutions with those filters, and then the normal-
ization is performed again. This leads to 16 feature maps of size
127× 127 each. Note that concatenating all feature maps values
leads to a feature vector consisting of 258 064 features, which is
7 times more than the SRM which consists of 34 671 features10.
After the two convolution layers, there is a fully connected
three layer neural network. The first and the second layers consist
of 1000 neurons, and the last layer only has 2 neurons. The oper-
ations carried out in the first and second layers are dot products,
bias additions, and the applications of the ReLU activation func-
tion. The operations performed in the last layer are dot products,
bias additions, and then a softmax in order to rescale the output
values in [0,1].
3.3.Clairvoyant scenario
Our first test is in the clairvoyant scenario. In this scenario, we
put forward the hypothesis that the steganalyst knows the embed-
ding algorithm, has good knowledge of the statistical distribution
of the image database used by the steganograph, and knows the
relative payload size. This scenario almost matches the Kerck-
hoffs principle. The steganalyst knows all the public parameters
(in the clairvoyant scenario, the selection channel is assumed to be
inaccessible), and does not know the private parameters such as
the embedding secret key. This scenario is a laboratory scenario
used to empirically assess the security of a steganographic embed-
ding algorithm [7]. We additionally make the hypothesis that the
8The normalization is done with a ”local response normalization
layer”. This enables detection of high-frequency features with a high neu-
ron response, while damping responses that are uniformly large in a local
neighborhood. This is a type of regularizer that encourages ”competi-
tion” for big activities among nearby groups of neurons. From the Cuda-
convnet documentation.
9α=0.001, β=0.75, and size=9.
10Note that we also tested a CNN with a feature vector of dimension
similar to SRM, by keeping the pooling steps, and 64 filters per layer, and
we obtained a probability of error 10% better than with an EC with SRM.
steganograph made the error to always use the same secret embed-
ding key and thus that the steganalyst has access to ”cover/stego”
images pairs where stego images are generated with this same se-
cret embedding key. Note that the embedding has been done with
the simulator using always the same key.
Our tests were carried out on the cropped BOSSBase
database, which consists of 40 000 grey-level images on 8 bits
and whose size is 256×256. We embed with S-UNIWARD [17]
at 0.4 bits per pixels. The obtained set of images is thus made of
80 000 images (40 000 covers and 40 000 stegos). We limited our
experiments to a single payload size due to the high number of
computations, and the high number of experiments on the CNNs.
Three steganalysis approaches were evaluated. The first ste-
ganalysis was done using Rich Models [3] and an Ensemble Clas-
sifier [5]. The Rich Models is the SRM whose dimension is
34671. We will denote this steganalysis, RM+EC, for Rich Mod-
els and Ensemble Classifier. The second steganalysis was done
using the most efficient CNN we built (see Fig. 5). We denote
this steganalysis, CNN, for Convolutional Neural Network. The
third steganalysis was done using the a Fully Connected Neural
Network (see Fig. 6). We denote this steganalysis, FNN, for
Fully-Connected Neural Network.
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Figure 6. A Fully Connected Neural Network (FNN).
For each payload size, we conducted 10 tests where, for each
test, the learning was done on 60 000 images randomly taken
from the 80 000 images, such that the covers and stegos are al-
ways paired. The tests were performed on 10 000 images (5000
covers and 5000 associated stegos) randomly taken from the 20
000 remaining images. For the Ensemble Classifier, the decision
threshold of each base learner was adjusted to minimize the total
detection error under equal priors on the training set11. For CNN,
and FNN, the sum of the errors was minimized on the training set,
11We used two different Ensemble Classifiers. The one given on the
Binghamton website12; in that case the learning set only consists of 10 000
images, and the one written in C++ and proposed in the paper [11] with the
features selection, and parallelization options; in that case, the learning set
consists of 60 000 images. For those two cases, the results were similar,
and we only report here the results obtained with the Binghamton code.
as a gradient descent:
min
i=NT R
∑
i=1
l=1
∑
l=0
(hl(xi)− yi)2, (5)
with NT R being the number of training images, h0(.) (resp. h1(.)),
the CNN outputs giving a classification score for cover (resp.
stego), yi ∈ {0,1} the label (0 for cover, and 1 for stego) for the
ith input image xi.
For both RM+EC, CNN, and FNN, the probability of error
was computed and averaged over the 10 tests. The results are
summarized in Table 1.
RM+EC CNN FNN
Max 24.93% 7.94% 8.92%
Min 24.21% 7.01% 8.44%
Variance 0.14 0.12 0.16
Average 24.67% 7.4% 8.66%
Table 1. Steganalysis results under the clairvoyant scenario
for RM+EC, CNN, and FNN
Rich Models with the Ensemble Classifier gives a probability
of error of 24.67%, whereas CNN gives a probability of error of
only 7.4%, and FNN gives a probability of error of 8.75%. There
is thus more than 17% improvement by using our CNN, and more
than 15% with our FNN. This is an impressive improvement con-
sidering the difficulty to grab percentages on the probability of
error in steganalysis.
A first tentative explanation of the good behavior of the CNN
has already been given in the previous Sections. Our CNN gener-
ates better results than Rich Models associated with an Ensemble
Classifier for the following reasons:
i) the shape of the CNN is well chosen,
ii) the learning process is done through a single global opti-
mization,
iii) the filter kernels are optimized (which is not the case in Rich
Models),
iv) there is a high number of filters (64 filters for the first layer)
which enriches the diversity,
v) the second convolutional layer, which comes after what
looks like a spatio-frequencial decomposition (obtained via
the first layer), seems to act as the research of the presence
of signals in all the spatio-frequential bands,
vi) we eliminated the pooling step (compared to the Qian et
al. network) which was counter-productive because it was
acting as a down-sampling, and thus leading to information
loss.
vii) the security error due to the lack of understanding from the
steganograph about the security issues related to the use of
key. Due to this security flaw, the embedding path is always
the same and the embedding simulator always uses the same
pseudo-random number sequence for generating the change
probabilities. The steganalysis task is thus easier for a ste-
ganalyzer sensitive to the spatial content such as the CNN
or the FNN (this also explain why a steganalyzer such as
RM+EC, which is more sensitive to statistics, is less effi-
cient).
Note that a less structured network such as FNN gives impressive
results even though it is less efficient than CNN. Note that the
unknowns number for CNN is around 259 million (only 29 824
unknowns for the two convolutions layers, and 259 million for the
fully connected layers ), and for FNN is around 131 millions.
We also carried out an additional experiment that confirmed
that the first two CNN layers play a strong role in classifica-
tion. The experiment first consisted of ”cutting” another ”smaller”
CNN (with a pooling step) that was previously learned, by only
keeping the two convolution layers. The network was then noth-
ing more than a feature extractor; in this experiment there were
only 57600 features. Second, this feature extractor was used to ex-
tract, on the same learning database, one feature vector per image.
Third, an Ensemble Classifier used those feature vectors to learn a
model. The probability of error was computed and averaged over
10 tests. We observed that the Ensemble Classifier, that learned
with the features coming from the ”smaller” CNN, allowed to re-
duce the average probability of error by 0.4% w.r.t. the ”smaller”
CNN. This indicated that: i) feature extraction (i.e convolution
steps) is the most interesting part of CNN, ii) the fully connected
classifier part of CNN is not necessarily the best classifier. Note
that this ”smaller” CNN allowed us to obtain an improvement of
10% compared to RM+EC.
We would also like to comment on the adaptive scenario, i.e
adaptive steganalysis [21], also named selection-channel-aware
steganalysis [9]. When using adaptive steganalysis, the stegan-
alyst uses an estimation of the modification probability of each
pixel, as additional information for learning, in order to distin-
guish between cover and stego. In that scenario, authors from [9]
report a detectability improvement of 1 to 4% with the Ensemble
Classifier and SRM for detecting S-UNIWARD on the BossBase
database. At 0.4 bpp, the improvement was less than 2%. Those
results are not comparable with ours since our images are smaller,
but the 2% increment is really minor compared to the 17% CNN
increment.
One should also mention the obtained results in the clair-
voyant scenario when the steganograph uses a different key for
each embedding. The probability of error of the CNN is 45.31%
(max=48.73%, min=40.1%, variance=0.001%). The result is very
bad and this is probably due to the fact that the CNN is not able
to find any stego pattern. These result can be improved when
increasing the numbers of filters. We experimented a test on a
TitanX GPU card, with the Digits library, with a CNN of 128 fil-
ters for the first layer, 64 filters for the second one, 512 neurons
on the first layer of the fully connected network, and 2048 for
the second layer. The probability of error is reduced to 38.10%
(max=38.45%, min=37.92%, variance=0.000004). The increas-
ing of the CNN size allows to improve the efficiency of the net-
work but the performance is at the moment far from the state of
the art (RM+EC).
3.4.Cover-Source Mismatch scenario
Our second test gave a very interesting results in the case of cover-
source mismatch. The cover-source mismatch phenomenon oc-
curs when the sources model, obtained during the learning step,
differs from the sources that are used by the steganograph. From
a geometrical point of view, we can explain this inconsistency
problem by the fact that the cloud, describing the images used
by the steganalyst, is not located at the same place as the cloud
describing the images used by the steganograph. Only a few pa-
pers have assessed the cover-source mismatch in practice [12],
and [22, 6]. Nevertheless, no satisfactory solution is currently
available, even though there have been some attempts to under-
stand the phenomenon [23, 24].
In this case, we subsampled the cropped BOSSBase five
times, thus obtaining five different training sets. For each training
set, we built a CNN, and then we applied the classification model
on the LIRMMBase test database (The database is available at
http://www.lirmm.fr/~chaumont/LIRMMBase.html). We
report the average error probability over the five trials. Note that
the cover-source mismatch was present since none of the BOSS-
Base cameras are in LIRMMBase. Note also that we used the
same script as that used for BOSSBase in order to generate the
grey-level images. Moreover, the original images we used to
build the LIRMMBase, were uncompressed and came from three
known databases: Dresden, Raise, and Columbia. The average
probability of error, for RM+EC, CNN, and FNN are given in Ta-
ble 2.
RM+EC CNN FNN
Max 49.85% 5.90% 6.60%
Min 47.20% 4.00 % 5.40%
Variance 0.35 0.45 0.31
Average 48.29% 5.16% 5.89%
Table 2. Steganalysis results under the cover-source mis-
match scenario for RM+EC, CNN, and FNN. The learning was
done on BOSSBase and the tests on LIRMMBase.
We observed that the cover-source mismatch issue seriously
affected the performance of the RM+EC classifier. Its results were
close to those obtained by a random classifier. In return, CNN
showed incredible robustness to the mismatch phenomenon with a
5.16% probability of error. FNN gave similar results with a 5.96%
probability of error. Other experiments on BOWSBase [25] also
confirmed that CNN is robust to the cover-source mismatch phe-
nomenon, whereas RM+EC is not. BOWSBase is nevertheless
not a very practical database since the set of used cameras is un-
known, and since some of the cameras have also been used in
BOSSBase.
Surprisingly, the probability of error of CNN for LIRMM-
Base (5.16%) was lower than that from the cropped BOSSBase
(7.4%). This was because there are fewer texture images in LIR-
MMBase than in the cropped BOSSBase. The LIRMMBase is
thus easier to steganalyze. The CNN invariance to cover-source
mismatch was so good that the mismatch phenomenon was no
longer present, and we thus obtained steganalysis results that were
more related to the content complexity of the data-base [26] (Tex-
tured image databases are harder to steganalysis than homogenous
ones).
The robustness was probably due to the transformation done
by the two first layers (because keeping those layers and then
branching an EC gives results similar to those of the whole CNN).
Thus the feature extractor due to the first two layers gives features
that are robust to the cover-source mismatch. Those features are
probably invariant which means that the feature representation ob-
tained after the second layer is not sensitive to the different image
statistics. Assuming that the role of the first layer is to decom-
pose the noise signal (if the image is stego, this noise is the stego
noise) in a spatio-frequential decomposition, and that the role of
the second layer is to detect the presence of particular patterns in
the spatio-frequential bands, then this could explain the invariance
to the image content and thus the invariance to the cover model.
Additionally, the robustness may also be explained by the
fact that the CNN or the FNN are specialized in researching of
a spatial pattern of probability of change strongly occurring in
the ”same embedding key” scenario. The Figure 7 illustrates the
probability of change obtained after having counted how many
times a pixel has changed for the stego images from the cropped
BOSSBase database. One can observe that there are some pixels
that never change in the stego images and some that change almost
certainly.
Figure 7. Embedding site. In white the most probable sites and in black the
less probable ones.
We also tested the cover-source mismatch scenario when the
steganograph uses a different key for each embedding. The proba-
bility of error of the CNN is 42.07% (max=43.50%, min=40.90%,
variance=0.02%). The result is slightly better than the RM+EC
and is better than what was obtained in the cropped BOSSBase
database (the result was 45.31% for that scenario). With the
CNN of 128 filters for the first layer, 64 filters for the second
one, 512 neurons on the first layer of the fully connected network,
and 2048 for the second layer, the probability of error is 48.99%
(max=49.06%, min=48.92%, variance=0.0000002) what is as bad
as RM+EC.
4.Further discussion
4.1.Demystifying the CNN
In order to demystify CNN, we already explained that the learn-
ing was equivalent to minimization of a function having many
unknown parameters with a technique similar to gradient descent.
In this subsection, we make links with previous research on the
topic.
An important step of the CNN process is convolution as de-
tailed in Sections 2.2 and 3.3. Learning of the filter kernels is
done through minimization of the classification error using the
back-propagation procedure. This is thus a simple optimization
of filter kernels. This strategy already shown its efficiency in [27].
In that paper, some of the filter kernel values, which were used for
computing the feature vector, were obtained through optimization
with the downhill simplex algorithm. The objective was to mini-
mize the probability of error given by an Ensemble Classifier. The
learning achieved in the convolution layers of a CNN shares the
same idea that leads to customized kernels, well suited for ste-
ganalysis purpose.
When looking more precisely at the first layer, the kernel
seems to act as a multi-band filtering (see Figure 2, where we
can see the 64 kernels of size 7× 7 of our CNN). Some recent
articles use such spatio-frequential decomposition (or a projection
as in PSRM [28]) in order to compute Rich Models using Gabor
filters [29] or DCT filters (DCTR features) [30]. Those filters are
used to define projections that will then be used for computing a
histogram leading to a feature vector.
When looking more precisely at the second convolution
layer, which applies a very unusual convolution approach, noth-
ing similar could be found in recent papers dealing with feature
extraction, such as histogram computation [3, 28], non-uniform
quantization [31], feature selection [11], dimension reduction
[32], etc. Nevertheless something important is occurring in this
second layer which allows us to obtain features unsensitive to the
cover-source mismatch. By looking to the Equation 3, the role of
this second layer looks like searching patterns in multiple bands.
The sum of the convolutions from Equation 3 is a way to accu-
mulate presence clues of a searched signal in all the subands. The
second layer then outputs a set of maps giving some clues to a
signal presence.
To close the discussion about the CNN, we should also add
that the last treatment of each layer is a normalization step, and
that this type of processing can also be found in papers such
as [33] or [10]. This normalization is done in order to obtain,
comparable output values for each neuron. We should also men-
tion that further analysis on the activation function is requiered to
completely understand its impact. The activation introduced non-
linearity, which is also the case in the Ensemble Classifier through
the majority vote [5], or in Rich Models with the Min-Max fea-
tures [3].
4.2.”Same embedding key” scenario
In order to conclude the discussion, we should mention papers of
Ker [34] and Quach [35] that have studied the payload location
estimation problem, with the hypothesis that the same embedding
key is reused. Their scenario is different since it is used for the
forensic-steganalysis. With the classical steganalysis, the stegan-
alyst try to find if there is or not an embedded message. With
the forensic-steganalysis, the steganalyst often guess that embed-
ding has occurred, and he tries to recover information such as the
payload size, the embedding location, the secret keys, or the em-
bedded message.
Ker and Quach set their studies in the clairvoyant scenario
(the steganalyst knows the embedding algorithm, has good knowl-
edge of the statistical distribution of the image database used by
the steganograph, and knows the relative payload size) and adds
three additional hypothesis: (i) the steganograph always uses im-
ages of the same size, (ii) the steganograph always uses the same
key, and (iii) the steganalyst has access to a set of stego images
from the steganalyst, and he knows that those images are stego.
In the Ker’s article [34], payload location is estimated for the
LSB replacement algorithm with the use of the Weighted Stego-
image (WS) steganalysis method [36] in order to estimate covers.
With a set of stego images one can then accumulate clues about
payload location. In the Quach proposition [35], payload location
is estimated for the LSB replacement algorithm, the LSB match-
ing algorithm, and the LSB Replacement Group-Parity Steganog-
raphy. By using a Random Markov Model, Quach estimates the
modified locations for each stego image from the test set, and
then, by accumulating the location clues on all the test set, he can
estimate sufficiently well the payload location (greater than 90%)
when the payload is high (0.5bpp) and the number of images is
enough (100 to 10 000 depending of the steganalyzed algorithm).
Independently from the scenario (classical steganoganalysis
or forensic-steganalysis scenario), and independently from the use
of adaptive or non-adaptive steganography, we can observe that
those articles and our article, use the security weak due to the er-
ror made by the steganograph, and consisting to reuse the same
key. As stated before, this error leads to an easier localization of
suspect/modified pixels because the spatial pattern of probability
of change can be learned such as with our approach, or can be re-
covered as in papers [34] and [35] by accumulating clues obtained
from a set of stego images. With the knowledge of this spatial pat-
tern of probability of change it becomes easier to apply a classical
steganalysis, as in the present article, or a forensic-steganalysis
such as payload localization as in [34] and [35].
5.Conclusion
In this article, we propose to pursue the study of CNNs for ste-
ganalysis. We tested more than 40 CNNs and found the right
parameters for the steganalysis domain in the scenario where the
steganograph reuses the same secret embedding key for embed-
ding with the simulator in images. Instead of using a very deep
network, such as that proposed by Qian et al., our experiments led
us to use a network that is in height, and only consists two con-
volutional layers. We replaced the unconventional Gaussian acti-
vation function by a more classical ReLU activation function, we
suppressed the pooling step that was acting as a down-sampling,
and we pre-processed the images by applying high pass filtering
before feeding the CNN.
We evaluated CNNs in two different scenarios. The first
set of tests was done with the clairvoyant scenario. We used the
cropped BOSSBase database with embedding with S-UNIWARD
at 0.4 bpp. Compared to the state-of-the-art approach, i.e. the En-
semble Classifier with SRM features, CNN and FNN reduce the
classification error by a three fold.
The second set of tests was done with the cover-source mis-
match scenario. We used the BOSSBase with S-UNIWARD em-
bedding at 0.4 bpp for learning, and tests were carried out on the
public LIRMMBase database. The cover-source mismatch was
fully achieved since the cameras were different from one base
to another. The conventional method (RM+EC) totally failed to
detect the use of steganography in LIRMMBase since the clas-
sification error was 48.29% i.e almost a random classification.
Conversely, CNN exhibited natural invariance to the cover-source
mismatch with a classification error of 5.16%.
Our future studies will concentrate on different scenarios, on
improving some of the network parameters, and on gaining in-
sight into the network behavior. Moreover, further experiments
have to be done with different payload sizes, and different algo-
rithms.
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